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Introduction
For over twenty-five years, the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA),1 one of the few parts of the 1990s Republican Contract with
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1.

Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–10, 110 Stat.
1321, 1321-66 to -77 (1996) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523; 18
U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915, 1915A, 1932; 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1997a–1997c, 1997e–1997f, 1997h). The PLRA was part of the
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321.
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America2 actually enacted, has undermined the constitutional rights of
incarcerated people. For people behind bars and their allies, the PLRA
makes civil rights cases harder to bring and harder to win—regardless
of merit.3
We have seen the result in the wave of litigation relating to the
COVID-19 pandemic. When the pandemic began in early 2020, jails
and prisons were hard hit. Incarcerated people tend to be quite
medically vulnerable; the prevalence of chronic disease and disability is
exceptionally high behind bars.4 (A countervailing statistic is that
incarcerated adults average much younger than non-incarcerated,
notwithstanding the long-term aging of the American prison population.5) Equally important, imprisoned people lack most of the methods
2.

Contract with America: The Bold Plan by Rep. Newt Gingrich,
Rep. Dick Armey and the House Republicans to Change the
Nation 53 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (referring to the
PLRA’s predecessor bill, the Taking Back Our Streets Act of 1995, H.R.
3, 104th Cong. (1995)).

3.

For in-depth examination of the PLRA’s impact on damage actions, see
Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1555 (2003)
[hereinafter Schlanger, Inmate Litigation]. For in-depth examination of
the PLRA’s impact on injunctive litigation, see Margo Schlanger, Civil
Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court
Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 550 (2006) [hereinafter Schlanger, Civil Rights
Injunctions]. For statistics, see Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner
Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 UC Irvine L. Rev. 153
(2015) [hereinafter Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation]; and Andrea
Fenster & Margo Schlanger, Slamming the Courthouse Door: 25 Years of
Evidence for Repealing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Prison Pol’y
Initiative (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/
PLRA_25.html [https://perma.cc/53LL-CXR7].

4.

Margo Schlanger, Prisoners with Disabilities, in 4 Reforming Criminal
Justice: Punishment, Incarceration, and Release 295, 295 (Erik
Luna ed., 2017); Laura M. Maruschak, Marcus Berzofsky, &
Jennifer Unangst, U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 248491, Medical
Problems of State and Federal Prisoners and Jail Inmates,
2011–12, at 1 (2015), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/mpsfpji1112.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V6ST-9AKA].

5.

In 2019, the last year for which prison data are available, 13.1% of
sentenced state or federal prisoners were 55 or over; the corresponding
number in the U.S. as a whole was 29.7%. Compare E. Ann Carson,
U.S. Dep’t Just., Prisoners in 2019, No. 255115, tbl.9 (2020),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/p19.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3J3-SCPT],
with Population Distribution by Age, Kaiser Fam. Found., https://www.
kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-by-age [https://perma.cc/U8P22JTK] (last visited Nov. 2, 2021). On the long-term aging trends of the
prison population, see, for example, E. Ann Carson & William J.
Sabol, U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 248777, Aging of the State Prison
Population, 1993–2013 (2016), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/
aspp9313.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4SK-XBVW].
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non-imprisoned people can exercise to minimize their risk. They cannot
avoid communal spaces, whether for eating, living, bathing, or anything
else. The availability of personal protective equipment—masks,
preeminently—is controlled by institutional authorities, as is the level
of hygiene in most spaces. In prison and jail, one cannot choose with
whom to associate and whether to limit their association with the
unprotected or the uninfected; staff contact, in particular, is
mandatory. In short, while neither infection rates nor mortality
approached the devastation in nursing homes,6 both were far higher
than in the community: infections among incarcerated people have been
over five times and mortality triple the non-imprisoned rate.7
So beginning March 2020, incarcerated people facing a high risk of
infection because of their incarceration, and a high risk of harm because
of their medical status, began to bring lawsuits seeking changes to the
policies and practices augmenting the danger to them. Among the
requests: better sanitation, social distancing, mask use by facility staff,
vaccination, and release. Incarcerated individuals have won some of
these cases,8 and some of their losses have been due not to the PLRA
6.

In the United States, nursing home residents have been nearly fifty times
more likely to die of COVID-19 than the general population. See COVID19 Nursing Home Data, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
https://data.cms.gov/covid-19/covid-19-nursing-home-data (Feb. 12, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/MSL2-TJKF] (reporting 149,107 total COVID-19 deaths
among nursing home residents); Total Number of Residents in Certified
Nursing Facilities, Kaiser Fam. Found., https://www.kff.org/other/stateindicator/number-of-nursing-facility-residents/ [https://perma.cc/TLW6NMKB] (last visited Feb. 19, 2022) (1,290,177 residents in certified
nursing facilities in the U.S. in 2020); COVID Data Tracker Weekly
Review, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (Feb. 18, 2022),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covidview/
index.html#more-info [https://perma.cc/J4MP-HT4W] (926,497 total
COVID-19 deaths in the United States); and QuickFacts, U.S. Census
Bureau, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US# [https://
perma.cc/ SKH8-ZAET] (last visited Feb. 19, 2022) (estimating U.S.
population at 331,893,745 as of July 1, 2021). As of November 25, 2020,
“deaths in long-term care facilities account[ed] for 40% of all COVID-19
deaths” nationwide. Priya Chidambaram, Rachel Garfield, & Tricia
Neuman, COVID-19 Has Claimed the Lives of 100,000 Long-Term Care
Residents and Staff, Kaiser Fam. Found. (Nov. 25, 2020), https://
www.kff.org/policy-watch/covid-19-has-claimed-the-lives-of-100000-longterm-care-residents-and-staff/ [https://perma.cc/N4TL-SU9R].

7.

See Brendan Saloner, Kalind Parish, Julie A. Ward, Grace DiLaura &
Sharon Dolovich, COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Federal and State
Prisons, 324 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 602, 602–03 (2020) (making both
findings and noting that mortality figures are after adjusting for age and
sex distributions).

8.

Releases granted in, e.g.: Torres v. Milusnic, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713, 718,
746 (C.D. Cal. 2020), enforcement granted in part, denied in part, No.
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2:20-cv-4450, 2021 WL 3829699, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2021) (issuing
a preliminary injunction ordering defendants to expedite the process for
determining prisoners’ eligibility for home confinement or compassionate
release, taking into account their age and medical condition in light of
COVID-19); Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 453–54 (D.
Conn. 2020) (issuing a temporary restraining order “aimed at accelerating
the process for evaluating inmates for home confinement and compassionate release,” but declining to direct the warden to implement safety
measures); Amaya-Cruz v. Adducci, No. 1:20-cv-789, 2020 WL 1903123,
at *1–2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2020) (concluding that keeping a medically
vulnerable ICE detainee in a county jail during the COVID-19 pandemic
would violate the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Kennedy, 449 F.
Supp. 3d 713, 719 (E.D. Mich. 2020), reconsideration denied, No. 2:18-cr20315, 2020 WL 1547878, at *1, 3, 4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 2020) (ordering
the defendant immediately released from jail because he was “particularly
susceptible to COVID-19”).
Mitigation granted: Chatman v. Otani, No. 1:21-cv-268, 2021 WL
2941990, at *24 (D. Haw. July 13, 2021) (ordering the defendant to
immediately implement its COVID-19 Response Plan, including its social
distancing, personal protective equipment (PPE), and quarantine measures, and to provide regular access to a working toilet, sink, and drinking
water to all incarcerated persons); Carranza v. Reams, No. 1:20-cv-977,
2020 WL 2320174, at *15 (D. Colo. May 11, 2020) (ordering the defendant
to institute social distancing policies, enhanced sanitation procedures, and
increased monitoring of medically vulnerable individuals detained at a
county jail and to obtain a sufficient number of masks); Mays v. Dart,
453 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1099–100 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (requiring the defendant
sheriff to provide soap and/or hand sanitizer to all detainees, improve
sanitation, and to provide facemasks to all detainees who are quarantined,
but declining to order further testing or quarantining of new detainees or
to provide facemasks to all detainees), aff’d, 974 F.3d 810, 824 (7th Cir.
2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 69, 69 (2021); Criswell v. Boudreaux, No.
1:20-cv-1048, 2020 WL 5235675, at *25 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2020) (ordering
the defendant “to develop written policies on key COVID-19 related
issues,” but declining to require immediate testing of staff and people in
jail); Banks v. Booth, 468 F. Supp. 3d 101, 125–26 (D.D.C. 2020) (ordering the defendant to implement a medical care system, comply with social
distancing regulations, and continue their sanitation efforts and increased
testing), appeal dismissed, cause remanded, 3 F.4th 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
2021); Smith v. Barr, 512 F. Supp. 3d 887, 900–01 (S.D. Ind. 2021)
(requiring defendants to enforce mask requirements, maintain contact
logs, implement rapid testing and conduct contact tracing among prison
staff); Ahlman v. Barnes, 445 F. Supp. 3d 671, 694 (C.D. Cal. 2020)
(ordering defendants to implement social distancing measures, provide
plaintiffs with soap and hand sanitizer, provide daily access to showers
and clean laundry, require staff to wear PPE and wash their hands,
regularly screen and test incarcerated people, and provide adequate
medical care to any with COVID-19), stay denied, No. 20-55568, 2020 WL
3547960, at *5 (9th Cir. June 17, 2020), stay granted, 140 S.Ct. 2620, 2620
(2020); Seth v. McDonough, 461 F. Supp. 3d 242, 264 (D. Md. 2020)
(requiring defendant to “develop a comprehensive written plan to address
systematic testing and identification of COVID-19 positive detainees; long
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but to the high bar to constitutional liability.9 But time and again,
courts have thrown cases out based on the PLRA10—especially, on the
PLRA’s instruction to dismiss civil rights cases unless “such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted”11 (that is, unless the
incarcerated plaintiff worked the complaint all the way through the
prison’s or jail’s grievance system).

term provision of PPE; increased training, education, and supervision of
medical staff so that COVID-19 symptomatic and positive detainees
receive timely and appropriate care; and prophylactic protections for highrisk detainees”); Maney v. Brown, 516 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1184–85 (D. Or.
2021) (ordering defendants to offer all adults in custody a COVID-19
vaccine); Weikert v. Elder, No. 1:20-cv-03646-RBJ, 2021 WL 27787, at *1
(D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2021) (ordering defendant to require all staff, contractors, and incarcerated individuals to wear masks; continue COVID-19
testing protocols; screen and identify individuals at increased risk of severe
illness from COVID-19; provide clean drinking water; monitor incarcerated individuals’ temperatures; isolate and monitor those who test
positive; and ensure that isolation occurs in a non-punitive environment).
9.

See, e.g., Cameron v. Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978, 985 (6th Cir. 2020)
(finding that respondents had responded reasonably to address the risks
posed by COVID-19 and petitioners had, therefore, failed to demonstrate
that respondents had been deliberately indifferent to their health concerns
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Wilson v. Williams, 961
F.3d 829, 841 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Here, while the harm imposed by COVID19 on inmates . . . ‘ultimately [is] not averted,’ the BOP has ‘responded
reasonably to the risk’ and therefore has not been deliberately indifferent
to the inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 826 (1994))); Belton v. Gautreaux, No.
3:20-cv-278, 2021 WL 400474, at *3 (M.D. La. Feb. 4, 2021) (dismissing
action with prejudice because the defendants’ COVID-19 response did not
“satisfy the requisite state of mind indicative of subjective deliberate
indifference” (quoting Ruling and Ord. on Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion
for Temp. Restraining Ord. at 11, Belton, 2021 WL 400474 (No. 20-cv00278-BAJ-SDJ)); Maney v. Brown, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1196 (D. Or.
2020) (declining to release incarcerated individuals) (“[T]he question
currently before this Court is not whether ODOC has responded perfectly
to the COVID-19 pandemic, nor even whether it could do more to keep
AICs safe. The question before the Court is whether ODOC has acted
with deliberate indifference toward the health risks that COVID-19 poses
to those currently in custody. As the Court learned, quite the contrary is
true.”); Busby v. Bonner, 477 F. Supp. 3d 691, 704–05 (W.D. Tenn. 2020)
(finding that conditions at a jail “may be legally insufficient” but declining
to issue a preliminary injunction because “this is an issue that can be
remedied if addressed by the Jail, and thus is an inappropriate basis for
habeas relief”); Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1132 (N.D. Ill.
2020) (“[O]bjections about the speed or scope of action and suggestions
for altering it through a ‘prod’ do not support either half of the phrase
‘deliberate indifference.’”).

10.

See infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.

11.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
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The pandemic is far from the first situation in which the PLRA
exhaustion requirement has thwarted constitutional oversight of prison
and jail conditions.12 But it has exposed a particularly egregious
problem: the mismatch between a mandate to use internal grievance
systems and those grievance systems’ systemic inability to address
emergency situations. Here, we propose three solutions. To be clear,
implementation of these steps would constitute only a limited improvement; the result would merely be to increase the possibility of federalcourt adjudication of incarcerated plaintiffs’ claims on the merits,
reducing the collateral litigation of exhaustion efforts. But even these
partial fixes seem worthwhile.
The proposals are these: First, incarcerated plaintiffs should be
allowed to proceed with their federal lawsuits if the press of an
emergency renders a prison’s or jail’s grievance system “unavailable”
because it is unable to process their complaint quickly enough to offer
any relief. As we describe below, this is already the right answer under
existing case law—but so far, many district courts have declined to
follow this path. The second proposal focuses on possible actions at the
state and local levels, because it is corrections agencies, not the PLRA,
that determine what procedures must be exhausted or whether the
defense is raised in litigation. Any prison or jail unhappy with allowing
incarcerated plaintiffs to proceed in federal court or amenable to
allowing them to access court quickly in emergency circumstances could
implement working emergency grievance systems. We provide some
parameters to guide any such system. In addition, state legislatures
could enact legislation forfeiting or waiving the exhaustion defense in
cases seeking emergency relief. The third solution addresses the
reluctance of district judges to excuse non-exhaustion when they
should; we propose that the PLRA be amended to pretermit the
“availability” inquiry by eliminating the statutory exhaustion requirement in emergency situations. We offer suggested legislative text to
accomplish this end.

I.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act and
the COVID Pandemic

In four periods that together span the past fifty years, federal civilrights filings by incarcerated plaintiffs have followed four very different
patterns. After the federal courts opened to such lawsuits in the late
1960s and early 1970s,13 the volume of the litigation grew steeply for a
12.

See, e.g., Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law
in America's Jails and Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 139, 147–52 (2008).

13.

See Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform
Litigation as Litigation, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1994, 2000–05 (1999).
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decade—juiced by a slowly increasing prison population and steeply
increasing filing rates. From the 1980s to 1990, however, the overall
increasing number of cases was driven entirely by increases in both jail
and prison population; filing rates actually declined substantially over
the period. In the early 1990s, the two factors converged, both
increasing: from 1991 to 1995, the filing rate grew by 22.5% from 20 to
24.5 lawsuits per 1000 incarcerated persons, and the incarcerated
population increased by about 31% (over 375,000 people).14 All this is
illustrated in Figure A.
Figure A: Prison and Jail Population and Federal Civil Rights Filings by
Incarcerated Plaintiffs

It was in this environment that Congress in 1996 passed the PLRA.
Its supporters at least stated that their target was abusive lawsuits. As
Senator Hatch phrased it in one version of this point made repeatedly
14.

Litigation figures are calculated using data released periodically by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, available at Integrated Database
(IDB), Fed. Jud. Ctr., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb [https://
perma.cc/W6LS-5SWD] (last visited Feb. 15, 2022). Prison and jail population figures come from a variety of publications by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, a component of the U.S. Department of Justice. Sources are set
out comprehensively in Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, supra
note 3, at 57, updated by Margo Schlanger, Prison and Jail Civil
Rights/Conditions Cases: Longitudinal Statistics 2–3 tbl.A, https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3834658 [https://perma.cc/XHF5-SD3U], updated appendix to
Fenster & Schlanger, supra note 3, app. at tbl.A. Data and replication
code are available at Data Update, Incarceration and the Law: Cases
and Materials, https://incarcerationlaw.com/resources/data-update/
[https://perma.cc/284N-YTBX] (last visited February 20, 2022) (reproducing Schlanger, supra, tbl.A).
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in floor speeches in support of the various PLRA versions, “I do not
want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims. This legislation
will not prevent those claims from being raised. The legislation will,
however, go far in preventing inmates from abusing the Federal judicial
system.”15 In fact, the PLRA narrowed the possibility of relief for all
cases brought by incarcerated plaintiffs.16 The second half of Figure A
shows the result—a dramatic and (so far) permanent decrease in filing
rates and filing numbers.
One of us (Schlanger) has written at length about the particular
PLRA provisions that produced the decline in filing rates and filing
numbers.17 High on the list of contributors is the statute’s
“administrative exhaustion” requirement, which provides: “No action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983
of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.”18
The provision abrogated part of the 1980 Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act, which required incarcerated plaintiffs to
first have recourse to administrative grievance systems only if those
systems were “plain, speedy, and effective.”19
PLRA exhaustion is the subject of thousands and thousands of
district court and court of appeals decisions,20 and a startling six merits
opinions in the Supreme Court.21 The crucial takeaways from the
Supreme Court opinions are these:

15.

141 Cong. Rec. 27042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also, 141
Cong. Rec. 37797 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 141 Cong. Rec.
4275 (1995) (statement of Rep. Canady) (“These reasonable requirements
will not impede meritorious claims by inmates but will greatly discourage
claims that are without merit.”).

16.

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

17.

See supra note 3.

18.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

19.

See Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247,
§ 7(a), 94 Stat. 349, 352 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a)), quoted in Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 640–41 (2016).

20.

A basic search—adv: “42 USC 1997e(a)”—yields more cases than
Westlaw will display; it tops out at 10,000.

21.

Ross, 578 U.S. at 648–49; Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202–03 (2007);
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83–84 (2006); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.
516, 520 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 733–34 (2001); Ramirez
v. Collier, 142 S. Ct. 1264, 1275–77 (2022).
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1) Incarcerated plaintiffs need not plead exhaustion; failure to
exhaust is an affirmative defense, with the burden of assertion
and proof on the defendants.22
2) There are no federally prescribed standards requiring that
grievance systems be fair; states and localities can set their own
rules for how their grievance systems work.
3) The PLRA requires “proper exhaustion”—it imposes a
procedural bar on claims whose plaintiffs failed to follow
applicable grievance rules23 (though the courts of appeals hold
consistently that if the prison or jail chose, notwithstanding such
a failure, to address the grievance on the merits, the claim is
exhausted24).
4) The PLRA does not implement “traditional doctrines of
administrative exhaustion, under which a litigant need not apply
to an agency that has ‘no power to decree . . . relief,’ or need not
exhaust where doing so would otherwise be futile.”25 In particular,
even a litigant who seeks only damages must exhaust a system
that has no authority to provide damages.26
5) Judges lack discretion to excuse exhaustion based on good
cause, special circumstances, or the like. However—and this is the
crucial point explored below—the statute requires exhaustion
only of “such administrative remedies as are available.”27

Accordingly, under the current case law, if the defendants come
forward with appropriate evidence, the courthouse doors are closed to
incarcerated plaintiffs who did not manage to fully work their precomplaint grievance through a jail or prison’s grievance system—
whether they didn’t file a grievance at all, or filed but had a grievance
bounced for some technical error,28 or didn’t timely pursue every appeal
22.

Jones, 549 U.S. at 216.

23.

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90–91, 93.

24.

See, e.g., Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 657–58 (9th Cir. 2016).

25.

Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

26.

Id. at 740.

27.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

28.

See, e.g., Bracero v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 748 F. App’x. 200, 203
(11th Cir. 2018) (dismissing for non-exhaustion where plaintiff wrote a
small amount below the line that said “Do not write below this line”;
noting “that the grievances were still legible and just a few lines were
outside the boundaries of the space provided,” and that “the PLRA
demands that prisoners complete the administrative process in accordance
with the applicable grievance procedure set by the prison”); Elliott v.
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opportunity.29 The impact is frequently to foreclose redress for violation
of constitutional rights.
Moreover, the PLRA sets up awful incentives. The less effective
and more cumbersome a grievance system is, the more likely
incarcerated people are to either seek to bypass it or mess up its
technical requirements. Either path then immunizes staff and systems
from subsequent federal-court oversight. In other words, the PLRA
encourages prison and jail officials to impose burdensome rules that
make it easier to reject grievances for technical errors. Courts have
commented on this tendency many times.30
The problem is particularly acute when an incarcerated person
seeks to fend off an urgently looming injury. Federal injunctive practice
includes mechanisms to speed up litigation in emergency situations. But
these cannot solve imminent problems if the gatekeeping grievance
systems are too slow—which most are. Without special emergency
speed-ups, grievance systems can take months to complete even when
officials comply with their own deadlines. The systems typically require
multiple steps, each of which may take weeks or even months to
complete. A 2014 survey found a 90–120-day overall maximum time

Jones, No. 4:06-cv-89, 2008 WL 420051, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2008)
(noting grievance rejected for “writing outside the boundaries of the
form”); Freeland v. Ballard, No. 2:14-cv-29445, 2017 WL 337997, at *6–7
(S.D. W. Va. Jan. 23, 2017) (finding failure to exhaust when plaintiff
mailed multiple grievances in a single envelope rather than in separate
envelopes); Thomas v. Parker, No. 5:07-cv-599, 2008 WL 2894842, at *12
(W.D. Okla. July 25, 2008), aff’d, 318 F. App’x 626 (10th Cir. 2009)
(same, when grievance included a “Statement Under Penalty of Perjury”
pursuant to state law rather than the notarized affidavit required by
grievance policy).
29.

See McCoy v. Goord, 255 F.Supp.2d 233, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“It is well
established that to exhaust—literally, to draw out, to use up completely,
see Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed.1989)—‘[an inmate is required to]
grieve his complaint about prison conditions up through the highest level
of administrative review’ before filing suit.” (quoting Porter v. Goord, No.
1:01-cv-8996, 2002 WL 1402000, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2002))); accord,
e.g., Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001); White
v. McGinnis, 131 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 1997).

30.

See, e.g., Padilla v. Hasley, No. 2:15-cv-2693, 2017 WL 1927874, at *9
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2017) (noting grievance body’s actions “reflect using
procedural rules to avoid addressing the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, rather
than imposing an orderly structure on proceedings”), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1905963 (May 9, 2017); Barker v. Belleque,
No. 6:10-cv-93, 2011 WL 285228, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 26, 2011) (“[T]he
record reflects that plaintiff’s good faith effort to [exhaust] . . . was
stymied by defendants’ unreasonable interpretation and hyper-technical
application of the grievance rules.”).
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limit among those systems that specify such an aggregate limit.31 In
systems that instead set time limits for each step, just one step can take
as long as 100 days in some states.32 In either event, prison systems
often do not follow their own time limits, frequently taking even
longer.33 It’s true that most state prisons’ grievance systems provide
expedited emergency procedures, which in theory would allow
Incarcerated people to exhaust quickly and get into court with minimal
delay.34 While procedures and guidelines on processing time vary
31.

Priyah Kaul, Greer Donley, Ben Cavataro, Anelisa Benavides,
Jessica Kincaid & Joseph Chatham, Prison and Jail Grievance
Policies: Lessons from a Fifty-State Survey 23 (2015), https://
clearinghouse.net/resource/2016/ [https://perma.cc/Q8Y8-8LJ9]. In full
disclosure, this survey was done by Schlanger’s students with her advice
and supervision.

32.

Id.

33.

See, e.g., Gilbert v. Byars, No. 2:13-cv-2163, 2014 WL 4063020, at *6–7
(D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2014) (holding delays in final decisions from five to nine
months past the official deadline do not “represent[] a period of inordinate
delay excusing the PLRA’s pre-filing requirement” although delays of
fifteen months or more would do so), aff’d, 590 F. App’x 279 (4th Cir.
2015); Sweat v. Reynolds, No. 9:11-cv-1706, 2013 WL 593660, at *4–5
(D.S.C. Feb. 15, 2013) (noting delay of 150 days for a response although
the deadline was 70 days).

34.

Many states’ grievance policies specify a time frame within which they
will initiate action and respond to emergency grievances. For example,
Washington D.C.’s promises a response “within seventy-two (72) hours of
[the grievance’s] receipt.” D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Inmate Grievance
Procedure 19 (2020), https://doc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/
doc/publication/attachments/PP%204030.1L%20Inmate%20Grievance%
20Procedure%20%28IGP%29%2001-09-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8KJUQWH]. Arizona’s states that prisons shall provide “an initial
response . . . within 48 hours, and . . . a final decision within five calendar
days.” Ariz. Dep’t of Corr. Rehab. & Reentry, Inmate Grievance
Procedure 10 (2016) https://corrections.az.gov/sites/default/files/
policies/800/0802.pdf [https://perma.cc/P59D-JTXL]. Alaska’s requires
prison staff to “investigate and resolve the emergency grievance the same
day or before the end of the shift.” State of Alaska Dep’t of Corr.,
Policies and Procedures: Prisoner Grievances 11 (2006), https://
doc.alaska.gov/pnp/pdf/808.03.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP7H-8YMX].
Other states have vaguer standards. Kansas, for instance, simply states
that: “Emergency grievances shall be forwarded immediately. . . [and]
shall be expedited at every level.” Kansas Administrative Regulation § 4415-106, Kan. Sec’y of State, https://sos.ks.gov/publications/pubs_kar_
regs.aspx?KAR=44-15-106&Srch=Y [https://perma.cc/Z583-Q3WJ] (last
visited Apr. 6, 2022).
There can also be a significant lag between when prisons are supposed to
take action in response to such grievances and when they must actually
respond to the inmate. For example, in Florida, the reviewing authority
must review the complaint and initiate action “no later than two calendar
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widely,35 “[m]ost policies that specify time frames for emergency
grievances require responses within 24 to 72 hours . . . .”36
Unfortunately, the reality is often different. Recent decisions have
documented waits ranging from sixteen days to over two months
without a response from the “emergency” grievance procedure.37
Broadly applicable emergencies—the COVID-19 pandemic, floods
or hurricanes, and the like—stress grievance systems in three separate
ways. First, emergencies create new risks to safety, and those risks are
often administratively assigned to grievance systems to address.38
Second, the risks are particularly time-sensitive, requiring speedy
resolution if they are to be averted. Third, emergencies interfere with
ordinary staffing and the normal functioning of the prison system
itself—which not only augments risk but undermines timely and
appropriate grievance processing. The COVID pandemic has had all of
these effects. COVID has stressed prison and jail capabilities and,
particularly in the pandemic’s early months, many entirely shut down

days following receipt,” but has up to “15 calendar days” to provide the
inmate with a formal response, if an emergency is found to exist. Fla.
Admin. Code Ann. r. 33-103.006 (LEXIS through Apr. 14, 2022). See also
Mich. L. Prison Info. Project, Project: Prison and Jail Grievance Policies:
Lessons from a Fifty-State Survey, C.R. Litig. Clearinghouse (Oct. 18,
2015) https://clearinghouse.net/policy/2/5 [https://perma.cc/VY93-45DZ]
(follow link for Prison and Jail Policy Document Repository).
35.

See Kaul et al., supra note 31, at 23.

36.

Id. (citing examples of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Arizona, Hawaii,
and Massachusetts). The grievance policies themselves can be downloaded
at Prison and Jail Grievance Policies, supra note 34.

37.

See Hampton v. Baldwin, No. 3:18-cv-550, 2018 WL 5830730, at *9 (S.D.
Ill. Nov. 7, 2018) (twenty-nine days in a case in which a transgender
plaintiff alleged danger from being held in a men’s prison and denial of
essential mental health treatment); Morris v. Lee, No. 3:17-cv-857, 2018
WL 6204975, at *3 (S.D. Ill. July 18, 2018) (two months and nine days
between warden’s receipt of emergency grievance and determination that
it was an emergency), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL
4771017 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2018); Godfrey v. Harrington, No. 3:13-cv-280,
2015 WL 1228829, at *3, 7 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2015) (sixteen days where
the plaintiff claimed imminent danger from a cellmate, noting that the
former three-day deadline for responses had been removed from the
grievance policy) (“Simply put, Defendants cannot expect to kick Godfrey
out of court because he failed to follow an unwritten, nebulous rule,
especially when they cannot even articulate the boundaries of the rule.
The grievance process is not intended to be a game of ‘gotcha’ or ‘a test
of the prisoner’s fortitude or ability to outsmart the system.’” (quoting
Shaw v. Jahnke, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1010 (W.D. Wis. 2009)).

38.

See Kaul et al., supra note 31, at 7–8.
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functions like grievance processing. Some systems put everyone in lockdown—so that they couldn’t obtain grievance forms.39
For all these reasons, time after time, prison grievance systems have
proven unable to cope with COVID-related complaints.40 Consider as a
case in point the situation of John Dailey, a podiatrist sentenced to
serve 2.25 years in federal prison for Medicare fraud.41 He entered
federal custody in 2019 with a congenital heart defect and a terminal
form of non-Hodgkins lymphoma; he was immunocompromised due to
chemotherapy.42 He was housed at a special medical prison in North
Carolina. Dr. Dailey was 62 in May 2020, when he was one of the named
petitioners in a major civil rights lawsuit alleging grievous failures by
the federal Bureau of Prisons leading to catastrophic spread of COVID19 and resulting illness and deaths at his prison.43 After the district
court denied emergency relief for a variety of technical reasons,44 his
lawyers withdrew the case;45 the plaintiffs quickly attempted to
complete prison grievance processes (which some, including Dr. Dailey,
had initiated months earlier).46 For the other plaintiffs, this took over
two additional months.47 Dr. Dailey, however, did not have time; he
died of COVID days after the first case ended. He left a daughter and
his life partner, Cathy.48
PLRA workarounds, too, often fail. That’s what happened to Ira
Goldberg, 72, incarcerated in New York to serve an aggregate seven-to
fourteen-year sentence for three third-degree burglary convictions, after
39.

See infra note 57.

40.

On this point, see also Brandon L. Garrett & Lee Kovarsky, Viral
Injustice, 110 Calif. L. Rev. 117, 169 (2022).

41.

Hallinan v. Scarantino, 466 F. Supp. 3d 587, 593 (E.D.N.C. June 11, 2020).

42.

Id. at 592–93; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
and Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 8,
Hallinan v. Scarantino, 466 F. Supp. 3d 587 (E.D.N.C. June 11, 2020)
(No. 5:20-hc-2088).

43.

Hallinan, 466 F. Supp. at 590–92, 596.

44.

Id. at 609.

45.

Joint Stipulation of Dismissal at 1, Hallinan v. Scarantino, 466 F. Supp.
3d 587 (E.D.N.C. June 11, 2020) (No. 5:20-hc-2088).

46.

Resp. in Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, at 9–14, Hallinan v. Scarantino, No.
5:20-ct-3333 (E.D.N.C. filed Jan. 29, 2021).

47.

See id.

48.

Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Inmate Death at FCI Butner (Low)
(July 3, 2020), https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/pdfs/20200703_
press_release_but.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3UH-TXMZ]; Obituary for Dr.
John Dailey, The Bradford Era, https://www.legacy.com/us/obituaries/
bradfordera/name/john-dailey-obituary?id=7822834 [https://perma.cc/
U8PZ-9558] (last visited Mar. 24, 2022).
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several incidents in which he stole camera equipment and other
merchandise from stores.49 He suffered from serious, chronic medical
issues: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, emphysema, asthma,
chronic renal failure, gastroesophageal reflux disease, high blood
pressure, high cholesterol, and Parkinsonism. His respiratory problems
were so severe that the mere act of speaking left him short of breath.50
He faced obvious and severe risk from COVID, which he alleged his
prison did little to mitigate.51 His lawyers decided there was no point in
filing a civil rights action because of the PLRA’s restrictions on both
exhaustion and release.52 Instead, in April 2020, they filed a state court
habeas petition; it was dismissed at the trial level on the theory that
habeas does not allow release based on unconstitutional conditions of
confinement (instead, a civil rights action is the appropriate type of
lawsuit).53 Mr. Goldberg died on a ventilator in January 2021 while his
appeal of that decision was pending.54

II. Solutions
The remainder of this Article canvasses three possible solutions:
First, plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed with their federal lawsuits
if the press of the emergency renders a prison or jail grievance system
“unavailable” because it is unable to process their complaint quickly
enough to offer any preventive relief. As we describe below, this is the
right answer under existing case law—but so far, one Court of Appeals
and many district courts have declined to follow this path. Second,
prisons and jails could implement working emergency grievance systems
and state legislatures could enact statutes forfeiting the defense in
emergency situations. And third, the PLRA could be amended to
eliminate the exhaustion requirement in emergency situations. We
propose legislative text to accomplish this end.

49.

Brief for Petitioner–Appellant, People ex rel. Dean v. Reardon, 138
N.Y.S.3d 442 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021) (No. KAH 20-00549).

50.

Id. at 3.

51.

Id. at 5–9.

52.

Id. at 12–13.

53.

Id. at 3, 12.

54.

Petitioner’s Death Moots Appeal of Dismissed Habeas, Pro Se, July 4,
2021, at 11, https://plsny.org/wp-content/uploads/ProSe/Pro%20Se%202021
%20Vol%2031%20No%2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/DMV7-8BJH]; People
ex rel. Dean, 138 N.Y.S.3d at 442.
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A.

Solution 1: Judicial Interpretations of Unavailability

The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement includes its own limit: it
requires exhaustion of “such administrative remedies as are available.”55
In 2016, in Ross v. Blake,56 the Supreme Court explained: “an inmate
is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures that
are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained
of.’”57 The Ross Court elaborated three (non-comprehensive58) categories of unavailability: failure to exhaust does not bar a federal civil
rights action by an incarcerated plaintiff where the grievance system in
question offered only a “dead end,” where it was opaque to the point of
being unnavigable, or where officials thwarted its use.59
The language the Court used to describe the first type of
unavailability is worth setting out more fully:
First, as Booth [v. Churner] made clear, an administrative
procedure is unavailable when (despite what regulations or
guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead
end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any
relief to aggrieved inmates. Suppose, for example, that a prison
handbook directs inmates to submit their grievances to a
particular administrative office—but in practice that office
disclaims the capacity to consider those petitions. The procedure
is not then “capable of use” for the pertinent purpose. In Booth’s
words: “[S]ome redress for a wrong is presupposed by the statute’s
requirement” of an “available” remedy; “where the relevant
administrative procedure lacks authority to provide any relief,”
the inmate has “nothing to exhaust.” So too if administrative
officials have apparent authority, but decline ever to exercise it.
Once again: “[T]he modifier ‘available’ requires the possibility of
some relief.” When the facts on the ground demonstrate that no

55.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

56.

578 U.S. 632 (2016).

57.

Id. at 642 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)).

58.

See, e.g., Williams v. Corr. Officer Priatno, 829 F.3d 118, 123 n.2 (2d Cir.
2016) (“We note that the three circumstances discussed in Ross do not
appear exhaustive, given the Court’s focus on three kinds of circumstances
that were ‘relevant’ to the facts of that case.”); Andres v. Marshall, 867
F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2017) (describing the three circumstances listed
in Ross as “a non-exhaustive list”); West v. Emig, 787 F. App’x 812, 815
(3d Cir. 2019) (“[N]either the Supreme Court nor this Circuit has held
that those three circumstances [listed in Ross] are comprehensive, as
opposed to exemplary.”); Ramirez v. Young, 906 F.3d 530, 538 (7th Cir.
2018) (explaining that the three types of unavailability listed in Ross
“were only examples, not a closed list”).

59.

Ross, 578 U.S. at 643–44.
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such potential exists, the inmate has no obligation to exhaust the
remedy.60

So under Ross v. Blake, if a prison system has, say, stopped
processing grievances because of a COVID-related staff shortage (or for
any other reason), or has locked people in their cells without making
provision for collecting grievances, the administrators have rendered the
grievance system unambiguously unavailable. Plaintiffs incarcerated in
affected jails and prisons should therefore be able to file their lawsuits
without first running the gauntlet of the unavailable system. Incarcerated plaintiffs have for this reason prevailed on exhaustion arguments
in COVID-19 litigation when administration or staff closed off grievance
systems by policy or proclamation61 or by malfeasance.62 Thus, where
officers refused to provide grievance forms to some individuals, threatened to transfer those who complained to COVID-19-infested areas,
and made such a transfer in at least one case, the court held that
exhaustion had been “thwarted by machination and intimidation.”63
Other decisions take a similar approach.64
60.

Id. at 643 (citations omitted) (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 736 & n.4, 738).

61.

See Maney v. Brown, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1207 (D. Or. 2020) (holding
remedy unavailable where officials admittedly were “not accepting
grievances relating to COVID-19 emergency operations, nor ‘general
grievances regarding social distancing, isolation, and quarantine of other
AICs, or modified operations such as the visiting shutdown’ because doing
so is ‘inconsistent with ODOC’s rules’”; they had accepted only fourteen
of 216 COVID-19-related grievances (quoting Decl. of Jacob Humphreys
in Supp. of Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for TRO and Prelim. Inj. at 5,
Maney, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (No. 6:20-cv-00570))); Gumns v. Edwards,
No. 3:20-cv-231, 2020 WL 2510248, at *3 (M.D. La. May 15, 2020)
(holding remedy unavailable where defendants had declared their
grievance program “non-essential and suspended”); Torres v. Milusnic,
472 F. Supp. 3d 713, 742–43 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (applying § 1997e(a) even
though the case was a habeas corpus proceeding, but excusing nonexhaustion and finding unavailability because Incarcerated individuals
were “instructed by prison officials not to submit grievances and requests
for compassionate release because such grievances and requests were not
being accepted due to understaffing”).

62.

Cameron v. Bouchard, 462 F. Supp. 3d 746, 769–70 (E.D. Mich. 2020),
on reconsideration, No. 2:20-cv-10949, 2020 WL 2615740 (E.D. Mich. May
22, 2020), vacated on other grounds, 815 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2020).

63.

Id.

64.

See Bonnett v. Comm’r of Corr., No. 8:20-cv-3529, 2021 WL 1516052, at
*7 (D. Md. Apr. 15, 2021) (declining to find remedy available in light of
evidence that “forms for seeking an appeal of the Warden’s decision are
not available to inmates because officers will not hand them out and
because the inmate library is closed”); Wilson v. Ponce, No. 20-cv-4451,
2020 WL 5118066, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2020) (holding remedy
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A more general conclusion of unavailability is equally correct: When
a grievance seeks time-sensitive prevention of harm, but the grievance
system is unable to respond promptly, that deficit renders the grievance
system “a simple dead end,” in Ross v. Blake terms65—such that its use
is not a prerequisite to a federal lawsuit. It would be prudent for a
would-be plaintiff to try to use the grievance system, but if the process
is proceeding too slowly to award “some relief for the action complained
of,”66 the courthouse doors should not be closed. The leading Court of
Appeals decision on the interaction of the PLRA with this kind of
urgency is Fletcher v. Menard Correctional Center,67 a Seventh Circuit
opinion by then-Judge Richard Posner. In Fletcher, the Court of
Appeals held that a grievance system that cannot grant relief quickly
enough to avert serious physical injury to the plaintiff is not an
“available” remedy within the meaning of the statute, though it added
that if the grievance system provides for emergency relief, the grievant
must attempt to use that system before coming to court.68 Judge Posner
wrote (anticipating the Ross v. Blake approach):

unavailable based on evidence that staff were not accepting grievance
forms, were failing to process grievances that were filed, and were telling
incarcerated people they were “too busy with COVID-19 to deal with
complaints”); Ahlman v. Barnes, 445 F. Supp. 3d 671, 687 (C.D. Cal.
2020) (holding remedies exhausted where defendants “refused to
adjudicate some of the grievances and denied others but failed to
adjudicate the appeal”), stay denied, No. 20-55568, 2020 WL 3547960 (9th
Cir. June 17, 2020), stay granted, 140 S. Ct. 2620 (2020); Criswell v.
Boudreaux, No. 20-cv-01048, 2020 WL 5235675, at *17 (E.D. Cal. Sept.
2, 2020) (finding probability of success on unavailability of the remedy
and citing evidence of intimidation and retaliation against individuals who
spoke to the ACLU, including repeated questioning about the interviews,
transfer to less desirable work assignments with higher risk of COVID-19
exposure, and reclassification and transfer to higher-security units; finding
of unavailability concerned access to counsel in COVID-19 case); J.H. ex
rel. N.H. v. Edwards, No. 20-cv-293, 2020 WL 3448087, at *42–44 (M.D.
La. June 24, 2020) (finding likelihood of success by plaintiffs on exhaustion
question where third-party grievants, permitted in this system, sent
grievances to the wrong place, but did so per official instructions, and
where a named plaintiff completed the emergency grievance process, and
the policy did not say he had to then start over with the general grievance
process (and in fact suggested the opposite)). But see Sanchez v. Brown,
No. 3:20-cv-832, 2020 WL 2615931, at *17 (N.D. Tex. May 22, 2020)
(dismissing complaints about functioning of grievance system as “special
circumstances” without discussing availability under Ross).
65.

Ross, 578 U.S. at 643.

66.

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001).

67.

623 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 2010).

68.

Id. at 1173–75.
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[A] case in which the prisoner might be killed if forced to exhaust
remedies that do not include any remedy against an imminent
danger is not a circumvention case and is not controlled by Booth
[v. Churner], which in any event distinguished between a case in
which there are remedies but none to the prisoner’s liking (which
was the Booth case) and a case in which there is no remedy; for
the Court said that “without the possibility of some relief, the
administrative officers would presumably have no authority to
act on the subject of the complaint, leaving the inmate with
nothing to exhaust.” If it takes two weeks to exhaust a complaint
that the complainant is in danger of being killed tomorrow, there
is no “possibility of some relief” and so nothing for the prisoner
to exhaust.69

By contrast, in Valentine v. Collier,70 the Fifth Circuit reached
more-or-less the opposite conclusion. Asked by the plaintiffs to excuse
non-exhaustion on the theory that the slow process on offer was for that
reason “unavailable” under Ross v. Blake, the court found for the defendants:
The district court impermissibly applied a “special
circumstances” exception, like the one the Supreme Court
rejected in Ross, under the guise of an availability analysis. Its
main rationale was that [the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice’s (“TDCJ”)] grievance process is incapable of responding
to the rapid spread of COVID-19. In other words, the grievance
process is not amenable to current circumstances. But under
Ross, special circumstances—even threats posed by global
pandemics—do not matter. . . .
....
Here, the district court heard evidence that Plaintiffs obtained
soap and cleaning supplies, COVID-19 testing, and the halt of
transfers into the Pack Unit, which they requested through the
grievance process at various points after commencing this
litigation. The court discounted that evidence because those
changes were not a direct response to Plaintiffs’ grievances.
Indeed, the court noted “[i]n some of these instances, TDCJ
changed its policies prior to a grievance being filed.” . . . From
there, the court concluded that the grievance process was
unresponsive and thus unavailable. We do not follow the district
court’s logic. To the contrary, TDCJ’s conduct shows that it was
capable of providing “some relief for the action complained of,”

69.

Id. at 1174 (citations omitted) (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 736 n.4).

70.

Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 2020).
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which is enough to render the grievance process “available” under
the PLRA.71

An earlier motions panel in the case took the same approach when
it stayed a district court injunction,72 provoking Justice Sotomayor’s
warning, issued in an opinion (joined by Justice Ginsburg) respecting
the Supreme Court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the Court of
Appeals’ stay:
The Fifth Circuit seemed to reject the possibility that
grievance procedures could ever be a “dead end” even if they
could not provide relief before an inmate faced a serious risk of
death. But if a plaintiff has established that the prison grievance
procedures at issue are utterly incapable of responding to a
rapidly spreading pandemic like Covid–19, the procedures may be
“unavailable” to meet the plaintiff’s purposes, much in the way
they would be if prison officials ignored the grievances entirely.
Here, of course, it is difficult to tell whether the prison’s system
fits in that narrow category, as applicants did not attempt to
avail themselves of the grievance process before filing suit. But I
caution that in these unprecedented circumstances, where an
inmate faces an imminent risk of harm that the grievance process
cannot or does not answer, the PLRA’s textual exception could
open the courthouse doors where they would otherwise stay
closed.73

In this debate, the Seventh Circuit is clearly correct and the Fifth
Circuit clearly incorrect. The problem is that, in Valentine, the Fifth
Circuit mistook the possibility of a non-litigated solution of the
plaintiffs’ problems for the possibility of a grievance-related remedy.
Whether the Texas prison system was “capable of providing ‘some
relief’”74 is not the relevant statutory question; that question is, rather,
whether the grievance system was so capable. It was not; that’s why
the district court found the timing so telling.
District courts have written decisions all over the map. In case after
case, federal courts have rejected claims by incarcerated people
reporting grave preexisting conditions that put them at risk for more
71.

Id. at 161–62 (citations omitted) (first quoting Valentine v. Collier, 490
F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1162 (S.D. Texas 2020), stay granted, 978 F.3d 154 (5th
Cir. 2020); and then quoting Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016)).

72.

Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 805–06 (5th Cir. 2020) (staying
preliminary injunction mitigating COVID-19 risks where plaintiffs had
not exhausted administratively before seeking it).

73.

Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598, 1600–01 (2020) (statement of
Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.) (citing Ross, 578 U.S. at 642–43).

74.

Valentine, 978 F.3d at 162 (quoting Ross, 578 U.S. at 642).
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serious COVID-19 illness, combined with officials’ utter failure to
mitigate pandemic risks, because the incarcerated plaintiffs had not
followed months-long grievance procedures prior to seeking emergency
relief in federal court. When prisons failed to test, did not provide
hygienic supplies like soap and sanitizer, failed to provide or require
staff and incarcerated people to wear face masks, made social distancing
impossible, or failed to treat COVID illness, the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement immunized all these failures from civil rights enforcement,
regardless of the merits or equities.75 Courts have routinely denied
requests for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions
where the incarcerated plaintiffs appear not to have exhausted or do
not show at the outset that they have exhausted.76
But other courts (though no appellate courts at this point) have
accepted arguments by plaintiffs that a prolonged administrative
process is unavailable, for PLRA purposes, when lawsuits complain of
a highly contagious, fast-spreading epidemic and seek preventive steps.
As one district judge put it:
75.

See, e.g., Coleman v. Jeffries, No. 20-4218, 2020 WL 6329469 at *1–2
(C.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2020) (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction and dismissing their complaint because they admitted they had
not exhausted their administrative remedies); Askew v. White, No. 5:20cv-264, 2020 WL 4194994 at *2–4 (M.D. Ga. July 21, 2020) (holding that
plaintiff’s action must be dismissed because, “[o]n its face, Plaintiff’s
complaint clearly shows that he did not exhaust administrative remedies
prior to filing this lawsuit,” and “[c]ontrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the
Court has ‘no discretion to waive this exhaustion requirement’” (quoting
Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1372 (11th Cir. 2008))); Ball v. Ohio, No.
2:20-cv-1759, 2020 WL 1956836 at *2–4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 23, 2020) (“[I]t
is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE in its entirety for failure to comply with the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirements.”), report and recommendation adopted,
2020 WL 2468742 at *1 (S.D. Ohio May 13, 2020); Abdulaziz/Askew v.
Payne, No. 4:20-cv-529, 2021 WL 1745514 at *2 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 20, 2021)
(holding the plaintiff’s claims “should be DISMISSED, without prejudice,
based on his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing
suit”), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1740081 * at 1
(E.D. Ark. May 3, 2021); Nellson v. Barnhart, 454 F. Supp. 3d 1087,
1093–94 (D. Colo. 2020) (holding that the ninety-day regular grievance
process is not a “dead end” since “some relief” is available, as defendants
had taken some protective actions) (quoting Ross, 578 U.S. at 642–43)).

76.

E.g., Pelino v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 791 F. App’x 371, 373 (3d Cir.
2020) (per curiam) (stating “exhaustion is a preliminary requirement
before addressing the merits of a litigant’s claim for relief” in injunctive
case alleging constitutional violations); Coleman v. Jeffries, No. 20-4218
2020 WL 6329469, at *2 (holding plaintiffs cannot show likelihood of
success if they have not exhausted); Victory v. Berks Cnty., No. 18-cv5170, 2019 WL 653788, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2019) (“If [Plaintiff] does
not carry her burden of showing exhaustion, she cannot demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits of her claim . . . .”).
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The Court appreciates that the Connecticut [Department of
Correction] grievance procedure is available and capable of
offering relief in ordinary times. However, these are not ordinary
times. The Connecticut DOC grievance procedure, which lacks an
emergency review process, was not set up with a pandemic in
mind. Although Defendants’ point that not every grievance will
require 105 business days to resolve is well taken, the imminent
health threat that COVID-19 creates has rendered DOC’s
administrative process inadequate to the task of handling
Plaintiffs’ urgent complaints regarding their health. . . . Because
COVID-19 spreads “easily and sustainably,” Plaintiffs risk
contracting the disease while foregoing these hygienic precautions
and attempting to exhaust the DOC’s administrative grievance
procedure, which occurs in four stages and involves an informal
resolution process, the filing of an initial formal complaint, and
two rounds of appeals. In this context, the DOC’s administrative
grievance process is thus, “practically speaking, incapable of use”
for resolving COVID-19 grievances. As such, the Court concludes
that administrative remedies for the relief that Plaintiffs seek are
unavailable, and thus exhaustion is not required for Plaintiffs to
proceed on their § 1983 claims.77

Another decision, rejecting Valentine’s analysis that administrative
remedies are available as long as some solution may be implemented
sometime (regardless of the connection to the grievance), held that a
grievance system was unavailable, in part because it “contain[ed] no
deadlines and therefore fail[ed] to assure that an inmate’s grievance
w[ould] be reviewed by [Maryland’s Division of Pretrial Detention and
Services] before the inmate [was] affected by COVID-19.”78 And another
court held that an incarcerated person who filed an emergency grievance about his COVID-19 complaints, with a seventy-two-hour
deadline for response, had exhausted for the class he sought to represent
where he had not received a response after six days had passed.79
77.

McPherson v. Lamont, 457 F. Supp. 3d 67, 81 (D. Conn. 2020) (citations
omitted) (quoting Ross, 578 U.S. at 643) (citing Fletcher v. Menard Corr.
Ctr., 623 F.3d 1171, 1173 (7th Cir. 2010)); accord Smith v. DeWine, 476
F. Supp. 3d 635, 657 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (denying dismissal for nonexhaustion because court “does not believe the Director has upheld her
burden of showing that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies and that doing so would not be a dead end in light of the
pandemic”).

78.

Duvall v. Hogan, No. 1:94-cv-2541, 2020 WL 3402301, at *8 (D. Md. June
19, 2020).

79.

Banks v. Booth, 468 F. Supp. 3d 101, 120–21 (D.D.C. 2020), appeal
dismissed, cause remanded, 3 F.4th 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2021); accord,
e.g., Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d 799, 831–34 (E.D. Ark. 2020)
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That the PLRA is generally unfavorable to incarcerated individuals
does not justify still more plaintiff-unfriendly applications. The PLRA
simply does not require that incarcerated people be stuck with a
grievance system incapable of responding timely to them, whatever
danger they face and whatever the urgency of relief. Ross v. Blake’s
approach requires that courts consider “real-world workings of prison
grievance systems” in assessing whether a prison’s administrative
remedy is in fact available to provide relief in emergency situations.80
This interpretive solution to the PLRA’s emergency problem requires
lower courts to carefully consider grievance systems’ ability to address
emergencies in a meaningful timeframe in order to give meaning to the
one exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion mandate—availability.
B.

Solution 2: State and Local Grievance Systems,
and Statutory Waiver

Although the PLRA is a federal statute, and although it limits the
ability of incarcerated people to access the federal courts, there is
nonetheless a significant role state and local agencies and legislatures
can play in developing solutions to the problem we identify. The rules
and requirements of exhaustion under the PLRA are defined by prisons
and jails’ grievance processes, not by the PLRA itself. That is, the
PLRA requires incarcerated plaintiffs to exhaust the available remedies,
but leaves the defendant agencies to determine what remedies and
related procedures will be offered.81 Prisons and jails are free to
implement working emergency grievance systems that could address
emergencies in an expedited time frame and, where the systems fail to
provide adequate relief, allow incarcerated people who have used them
expedient access to the federal courts.82 Additionally (or alternatively),
state legislatures could waive PLRA exhaustion by enacting statutes
forfeiting or waiving the affirmative defense of exhaustion in cases in
which emergency relief is sought. We discuss each of these in turn.
Grievance systems that allow for the serious consideration of
emergency relief must include three key features: (1) appropriate
inclusion of urgent matters; (2) speedy processing, with timing able to
(declining to find for defendants on exhaustion claims given open issues,
including whether remedy was sufficiently timely available).
80.

Ross, 578 U.S. at 643.

81.

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).

82.

For a recent proposal that, like our Solution 2, emphasizes state responses
to the PLRA, see Melissa Benerofe, Note, Collaterally Attacking the
Prison Litigation Reform Act's Application to Meritorious Prisoner Civil
Litigation, 90 Fordham L. Rev. 141 (2021) (recommending that states
process prison grievances electronically, and give access to the resulting
electronic records to legal aid organizations litigating prisoner civil rights
cases).
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both prevent looming harm and allow for prompt court access; and (3)
procedures simple enough that an incarcerated person facing an
emergency can reasonably be expected to follow them.
On the first point—coverage—Delaware, for example, has a formula
that makes sense. Its emergency process covers “[a]n issue that concerns
matters which under regular policy time limits would subject the inmate
to a substantial risk of personal, physical or psychological harm.”83
What’s good about this text is that its criteria are functional, rather
than hinging on an arbitrary time limit. Several other jurisdictions use
similarly broad definitions of emergency that focus on the potential
harm to the individual or institution.84 These policies allow prison
officials to consider a broad range of circumstances that constitute an
emergency. Note, however, that they simultaneously give significant
discretion to prison officials to determine whether the individual’s
complaint is truly of an emergency nature. Typically, where the issue
is found non-emergent, these policies require the grievance to be refiled
or routed back into the standard, lengthier process.85 In our view, if a
83.

State of Del. Dep’t of Corr., Policy No. 4.4, Inmate Grievance
Policy 1 (2011), https://bidcondocs.delaware.gov/DOC/DOC_1205
Commiss_INFO2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TNX-EKW2].

84.

See, e.g., State of Alaska Dep’t of Corr., Index No. 808.03,
Prisoner Grievances 1 (2006) https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
policyclearinghouse/Documents/Alaska%20-%20808.03.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FV7C-BYK6]; Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.001 (LEXIS through
Apr. 14, 2022) https://www.flrules.org/gateway/RuleNo.asp?title=
INMATE%20GRIEVANCE%20PROCEDURE&ID=33-103.002 [https://
perma.cc/RA5J-UL2Z]; Ill. Dep’t of Corr., DR 504, Grievance
Procedures 12 (2003), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/policy
clearinghouse/Documents/Illinois%20Grievance%20Procedures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UT8N-L7M5]; Miss. Dep’t of Corr., S.O.P. 20-0801, Grievance Procedures - Offender 4 (2012) https://www.law.
umich.edu/special/policyclearinghouse/Documents/Mississippi_SOP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SH7F-BYJT]; State of Vt. Dep’t of Corr.,
Directive: 320.01, Offender Grievance System 2 (2006), https://doc.
vermont.gov/sites/correct/files/documents/policy/correctional/320Grievance-System-Rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7BM-2HLX].

85.

See, e.g., Colo. Dep’t of Corr., Regul. No. 850-04, Grievance
Procedure 8 (2022), https://cdoc.colorado.gov/about/departmentpolicies [https://perma.cc/9P9T-CH7K]; Kan. Admin. Regs. § 44-15-101
(Westlaw through Apr. 7, 2022); Nev. Dep’t of Corr., Admin. Regul.
740, Inmate Grievance Procedure 8–9 (2018), https://doc.nv.gov/
uploadedFiles/docnvgov/content/About/Administrative_Regulations/AR
%20740%20-%20Inmate%20Grievance%20Procedure%20-%20Temporary
%20-%2011.20.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J8N-F63V]; Okla. Dep’t of
Corr., OP-090124, Inmate/Offender Grievance Process 17–18
(2022), https://oklahoma.gov/content/dam/ok/en/doc/documents/
policy/section-09/op090124.pdf [https://perma.cc/G99E-6HWQ]; Tenn.
Dep’t of Corr., Index No. 501.01, Inmate Grievance Procedures 5
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prison grievance officer inappropriately fails to treat a grievance as an
emergency, that renders the (slower, ordinary) grievance process
unavailable under Ross v. Blake. This approach finds some support in
the case law,86 but some courts instead—and we think erroneously—
simply dismiss those claims for non-exhaustion.87
As to the second point—speedy processing—a functional emergency
grievance process is one that can be exhausted expeditiously. Some
jurisdictions appropriately require emergency grievances to be answered
within a few days or even hours. For example, Colorado and Wyoming
require grievances deemed emergencies to be answered within three
business days.88 Virginia and Washington require a response within
eight hours.89 By contrast, some jurisdictions have an emergency

(2021), https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/correction/documents/50101.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PAE-XZS7]; Admin. Rev. & Risk Mgmt.
Div., Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., Offender Grievance Operations
Manual 16–17 (2012), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/policyclearing
house/Documents/TX%20Offender%20Grievance%20Manual.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7A5M-BN6Z] [hereinafter Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just.]; Wash.
State Dep’t of Corr., Offender Grievance Program 7 (2013),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/policyclearinghouse/Documents/Wa
shington%20Grievance%20Manual%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF3PPBBG]; see also Prison and Jail Grievance Policies, supra note 34
(archiving state policy documents, including offender grievance policies).
86.

See, e.g., Williams v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 957 F.3d 828, 832–34
(7th Cir. 2020) (allowing a case to proceed after a prison declared emergency grievance petition non-emergent, but state law failed to tell the
individual what his next steps should be).

87.

See, e.g., Thornsberry v. Kerstein, No. 2:20-cv-00182, 2021 WL 4784817,
at *4 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 31, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No.
2:20-cv-182, 2021 WL 4785791 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 13); Williams v.
Buchanon, No. 3:19-cv-1192, 2021 WL 488099, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 10,
2021) (dismissing for non-exhaustion where the plaintiff did not resubmit
a grievance that had been rejected as an emergency grievance); Rachel v.
Troutt, No. 5:15-cv-141, 2017 WL 9802855, at *5–6 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 31,
2017) (dismissing for non-exhaustion where prison officials disputed
grievance’s emergency designation, finding that the determination of
whether a plaintiff has raised an “emergency” is within the discretion of
prison officials), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1173000
(Mar. 6, 2018), aff’d, 764 F. App’x 778 (10th Cir. 2019).

88.

Colo. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 85, at 8; Wyo. Dep’t of Corr.,
Pol’y & Proc. No. 3.100, Inmate Communication and Grievance
Procedure 18 (2019), https://docs.google.com/a/wyo.gov/viewer?a=
v&pid=sites&srcid=d3lvLmdvdnxkb2N8Z3g6NjZmYzgyNDY2OGFhOD
c1YQ [https://perma.cc/Z2N2-P3XV].

89.

Va. Dep’t of Corr., Operating Proc. 866.1, Offender Grievance
Procedure 14 (2021), https://vadoc.virginia.gov/files/operatingprocedures/800/vadoc-op-866-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/69D3-GYH2]; Wash.
State Dep’t of Corr., supra note 85, at 8.
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grievance process only in name, without any specific timeframes or with
timeframes almost as lengthy as for regular grievances.90
In addition, an expedited response time is not all that is needed to
guarantee that incarcerated plaintiffs will be able to access courts
quickly. The standard appeal process in most grievance systems is a
multi-level, time-consuming process, and unless otherwise specified, is
available to those seeking relief under emergency procedures. This
means that, before bringing a claim for emergency relief to federal court,
a prospective plaintiff would need to exhaust the entire appeal process.
So expedited second level review is just as important as expedited first
level response. Moreover, the need for speed demands that emergency
grievance processes allow for no more than a two-step process (e.g., an
initial grievance and an expedited appeal). Washington’s emergency
grievance system provides a helpful model, at least with regard to its
timeline. Its policy is unique in that it requires an appeal of an
emergency grievance to be answered within twenty-four hours and
clearly specifies that a third level appeal, which would be available for
standard grievances, is not available for emergencies.91 Other states, by
contrast, do not specify a similarly expedited timeline for an appeal of
an emergency grievance.92
Finally, if an emergency grievance process is going to provide the
possibility of relief or meaningful access to courts for incarcerated
people facing emergencies, the procedures must be straightforward.
Prison grievance procedures are notoriously cumbersome and complex—difficult to follow under the easiest of circumstances, let alone
during a crisis.93 Emergency grievance procedures should be written in
90.

New York and Illinois, for example, include no specific timeframe for
response to emergency grievances. N.Y. State Dep’t Corr. & Cmty.
Supervision, No. 4040, Inmate Grievance Program 14 (2016),
https://doccs.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2020/11/4040.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5UZN-LF59]; Ill. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 84, at 12 (2003),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/policyclearinghouse/Documents/Illi
nois%20Grievance%20Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/C44A-FQW9].
Although Texas exempts emergency grievances from the informal resolution process, it subjects them to the same forty-day deadline for regular
grievances. Step II appeals in Texas are available for emergency grievances
and include a forty-five-day response time (thirty-five days for medical
emergency grievances). Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., supra note 85, at
17–18, 59, 78.

91.

Wash. State Dep’t of Corr., supra note 85, at 7, 8.

92.

See, e.g., Colo. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 85; Miss. Dep’t of Corr.,
supra note 84, at 7–8; N.Y. State Dep’t Corr. & Cmty. Supervision,
supra note 90; N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Administrative Remedy
Procedure 8–9 (2013), https://files.nc.gov/ncdps/div/Prisons/Policy_
Procedure_Manual/G.0300_08_01_13.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3SQ-VDBG].

93.

See Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study
of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 550, 592–93 (2006).
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simple language, and should be available in multiple languages and
accessible formats for non-English speakers and people with disabilities.
The emergency grievance procedures, including appeals, should be
entirely contained in one section of the grievance policy—rather than
scattered throughout, as seen in several policies that do not provide for
emergency-specific appeal processes.94 Prisons and jails should allow
third parties to submit grievances in the event that the emergency itself,
or other factors such as mental disability or fear of reprisal, present
barriers to filing.95
Given that prisons and jails may lack incentives to improve
emergency grievance procedures,96 state legislatures, which have in
recent times been more active in efforts to reform civil rights litigation,97
can step in where the agencies themselves do not provide working
solutions. It is well within the authority of state legislatures that wish
to avoid the negative consequences of the PLRA’s exhaustion rule to
overrule it by state legislation.98 After all, even the jurisdictional bar of
sovereign immunity can be waived by state statute.99 And the Supreme
Court has been clear: the PLRA exhaustion requirement is not
jurisdictional.100 In fact, it’s not even a pleading requirement, but rather
an affirmative defense.101 Accordingly, it may be intentionally waived,

94.

See supra note 92.

95.

In the context of claims involving sexual assault in prisons, the
Department of Justice recognized the importance of allowing third parties
to submit grievances on behalf of incarcerated people. The regulations
implementing the Prison Rape Elimination Act require prisons and jails
to allow grievances filed by third parties. 28 C.F.R. § 115.52 (2020).

96.

See Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in
America’s Jails and Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 139, 149 (2008).

97.

Alexander A. Reinert, Joanna C. Schwartz & James E. Pfander, New
Federalism and Civil Rights Enforcement, 116 Nw. U. L. Rev. 737, 769–
75 (2021). For recent examples of state statutes enacted to facilitate civil
rights litigation, see Act of June 19, 2020, ch. 110, § 3, 2020 Colo. Sess.
Laws 445 (codified as amended at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-131 (2021)),
amended by Act of July 6, 2021, ch. 458, § 6, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3054;
New Mexico Civil Rights Act, ch. 119, 2 N.M. Laws 1849 (2021) (codified
at N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-4A-1 to 41-4A-13).

98.

Reinert et al., supra note 97.

99.

See Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 284–85 (2011) (first citing Coll.
Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 680 (1999); and then Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maint., 492
U.S. 96, 101–102 (1989)).

100. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 101 (2006).
101. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214 (2007); Handberry v. Thompson, 446
F.3d 335, 342 (2d Cir. 2006).
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or forfeited by defendants’ failure to raise it (or failure to timely raise
it).102
Statutory waiver certainly suffices for cases against government
entities,103 but we think it would also be dispositive in damages actions
against state or local employees. After all, the PLRA’s caselaw holds
that waiver of administrative exhaustion need not be by the particular
individual defendant.104 Rather, courts have consistently held that if
prison officials decide the merits of a grievance rather than rejecting it
for procedural noncompliance, an individual defendant cannot rely on
that noncompliance to seek dismissal of subsequent litigation for nonexhaustion.105 As the Ninth Circuit put it:
102. See, e.g., Handberry, 446 F.3d at 342–43 and cases cited therein, finding
the defense waived or conceded. See also Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health
Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 679–80 (4th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the argument
that exhaustion defense is “not forfeitable” (quoting Brickwood
Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Eng’g, Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir.
2004))); Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 695–96 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding the defense was waived by failure to assert it in the district
court); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 647 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding
defense can be, and was, waived); Randolph v. Rodgers, 253 F.3d 342,
347 n.11 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 857
n.8 (8th Cir. 1999)); Perez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 536 (7th
Cir. 1999).
103. Some such cases proceed formally against government entities; others,
seeking injunctive relief, are nominally against government officers but
are for all intents and purposes (except sovereign immunity) against the
government. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 138 (1908); Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464,
471–72 (1985) (noting that the real party in interest in an injunctive case
against government officers is the state)).
104. Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004) (‘‘We are mindful
that the primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a
problem, not to provide personal notice to a particular official that he
may be sued; the grievance is not a summons and complaint that initiates
adversarial litigation.’’).
105. Does 8–10 v. Snyder, 945 F.3d 951, 962 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Reed-Bey
v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 325 (6th Cir. 2010)); Rinaldi v. United
States, 904 F.3d 257, 271 (3d Cir. 2018) (“We simply reaffirm . . . that
when an inmate’s allegations ‘have been fully examined on the merits’ and
‘at the highest level,’ they are, in fact, exhausted.”) (quoting Camp v.
Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2000))); Whatley v. Smith, 898 F.3d
1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[A] prisoner has exhausted his administrative remedies when prison officials decide a procedurally flawed
grievance on the merits. . . . [D]istrict courts may not enforce a prison’s
procedural rule to find a lack of exhaustion after the prison itself declined
to enforce the rule.”) (quoting Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison,
802 F.3d 1205, 1215 (11th Cir. 2015))); Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 658
(9th Cir. 2016); Whatley, 802 F.3d at 1213–14 (“We join our sister Circuits
in holding that district courts may not find a lack of exhaustion by
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When prison officials opt not to enforce a procedural rule but
instead decide an inmate’s grievance on the merits, the purposes
of the PLRA exhaustion requirement have been fully served:
prison officials have had a fair opportunity to correct any claimed
deprivation and an administrative record supporting the prison’s
decision has been developed. Dismissing the inmate’s claim for
failure to exhaust under these circumstances does not advance the
statutory goal of avoiding unnecessary interference in prison
administration. Rather, it prevents the courts from considering a
claim that has already been fully vetted within the prison
system.106

This rule, said the Court of Appeals, serves the government’s
additional interest in:
“deciding when to waive or enforce its own rules” . . . “tak[ing]
into account the likelihood that prison officials will benefit if given
discretion to decide, for reasons such as fairness or inmate morale
or the need to resolve a recurring issue, that ruling on the merits
is better for the institution and an inmate who has attempted to
exhaust available prison remedies.107

And specifically, courts have consistently rejected the argument
that government agencies cannot waive the non-exhaustion defense that
otherwise would be available to individual litigation defendants since
the exhaustion requirement is intended to serve institutional purposes,

enforcing procedural bars that the prison declined to enforce.”); Hammett
v. Cofield, 681 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (stating “all
circuits that have addressed it have concluded that the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement is satisfied if prison officials decide a procedurally
flawed grievance on the merits” and citing cases); Hill v. Curcione, 657
F.3d 116, 125 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding “the exhaustion requirement of the
PLRA is satisfied by an untimely filing of a grievance if it is accepted and
decided on the merits by the appropriate prison authority.”); Maddox v.
Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Where prison officials address
an inmate’s grievance on the merits without rejecting it on procedural
grounds, the grievance has served its function of alerting the state and
inviting corrective action, and defendants cannot rely on the failure to
exhaust defense.”) (citing Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir.
2005))).
106. Reyes, 810 F.3d at 658 (citations omitted) (first citing Porter v. Nussle,
534 U.S. 516, 525 (2002); and then citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 93 (2006)).
107. Reyes, 810 F.3d at 658 (first quoting Reed-Bey, 603 F.3d at 325; and then
quoting Hammett, 681 F.3d at 948).
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and since the grievance system at issue did not give individual
employees a role in controlling the resolution of grievances.108
The impact of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is heavily
dependent on states and municipalities—on the grievance procedures
they design and on their choice of whether to assert the defense.
Whether by creating functioning grievance systems that remedy
emergency situations or provide a swift process that allows potential
plaintiffs timely access to federal courts, or by enacting a statutory
waiver of the exhaustion defense, state and local governments can solve
the problem we identify.
C.

Solution 3: Federal Amendment

As already discussed, courts can solve the emergency relief issue by
implementing the PLRA by its terms—as Ross v. Blake insists. Or the
emergency relief issue can be solved at the state or local level—prison
and jail systems can enact a simple and timely emergency grievance
system or state and local legislatures can statutorily waive exhaustion
for emergencies. A third solution is within the power of the Congress.
It is to provide that, in an emergency, as defined by responsible agencies
of government or found by the court, a federal district court may order
relief without waiting for the prison administrative process. That relief
must be limited in time and scope to prevent or remedy significant risk
of harm arising from the emergency. Proposed legislative language
follows109:
Section 7 of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (42
U.S.C. § 1997e) is amended by adding at the end the following:
(1) RELIEF WITHOUT EXHAUSTING ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES.—Notwithstanding the other provisions of this
section, during an emergency circumstance, a prisoner need not
108. See Alexander v. Fillion, No. 2:16-cv-64, 2017 WL 1347998, at *4 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 14, 2017) (rejecting contention that “even if the MDOC
waived the procedural rule during the grievance process, the individual
Defendants never expressly waived their right to enforce it. . . .
Defendants’ argument has no merit because they do not have any
individual right in enforcing a procedural rule within the MDOC grievance
procedure.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1330307, at
*1 (W.D. Mich., Apr. 11, 2017); Benyamini v. Swett, No. 2:13-cv-735,
2015 WL 4879599, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal., Aug. 14, 2015), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:13-cv-735, 2015 WL 5611096, at *1 (E.D.
Cal., Sept. 23, 2015); Jewkes v. Shackleton, No. 1:11-cv-112, 2012 WL
5332197, *4–5 (D. Colo., Oct. 29, 2012), appeal dismissed, No. 12-1479
(10th Cir., June 11, 2013).
109. This proposed bill text addresses only administrative exhaustion because
that’s the subject of this article. Other PLRA amendments responsive to
emergencies—for example, relaxing the constraints on emergency releases
from dangerous confinement—would also be appropriate.
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exhaust administrative remedies with respect to prison conditions
that pose a significant risk of harm, including access to counsel,
to the prisoner before bringing an action related to the emergency
circumstance under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States (42 U.S.C. § 1983) or any other Federal law.
(2) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this subsection, the term
‘emergency circumstance’ means—
(A) an instance in the geographic area in which the prisoner
is located, with respect to which—
(i) the President has declared a national emergency under
the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.);
(ii) the Secretary of Health and Human Services has
declared an emergency pursuant to the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.);
(iii) there has been an emergency or disaster declaration
or resolution by a tribe; or
(iv) there has been a State, county, or local emergency or
disaster declaration pursuant to State law; or
(B) a situation at a particular jail, prison, or correctional
facility presents an immediate and significant risk to health or
safety of the prisoner or prisoners.

As can be seen, this proposed exception to the exhaustion
requirement is closely tailored to the emergency circumstances, both in
substance and in duration, so as not to undermine the present exhaustion requirement, which will continue to govern in non-emergency
circumstances. A complaint that is not exhausted and that claims an
emergency not declared by the relevant government actor, and not
otherwise deemed an emergency by the court, would be dismissed for
non-exhaustion. The current Congress probably lacks the necessary
appetite for such reform, but perhaps a future Congress could implement this legislative solution. It is a modest and narrow amendment
that largely leaves intact the exhaustion requirement.

Conclusion
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement has, for the last twenty-five
years, repeatedly closed the courthouse doors to incarcerated plaintiffs
seeking to vindicate the constitutional rights meant to protect their
health and safety behind bars. This is by no means a revelation.110 The
110. Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra note 3, at 1667–68.
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COVID-19 pandemic, however, has placed in stark relief just how
difficult it is for those in prison to get a hearing on the merits of their
claims for emergency relief. The three types of solutions proposed in
this article—the interpretative solution, the state or local solution, and
the federal legislative solution—either alone or in combination, would
alleviate some of the difficulties faced by incarcerated plaintiffs seeking
emergency relief, increasing the possibility that courts would hear
prisoner rights cases on the merits. To be sure, even with all of these
solutions implemented, incarcerated plaintiffs seeking relief from
pandemic-related constitutional violations face an uphill battle to
surmount many obstacles, among them: the stringent constitutional
standards that govern these claims;111 other provisions of the PLRA,
most notably, the constraints on federal courts’ ability to grant release
as a remedy;112 and inadequate access to counsel. Nonetheless, prison
litigation in and about the current pandemic has shown that justice
requires easing the burden of exhaustion in these limited emergency
circumstances.

111. See sources cited supra note 3.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3).
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